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We define a core-like solution concept of games in strategic form, called
a commitment-proof agreement, to discuss hee rider problems.
1 Introduction
The $\max$-mini behavior, which can be track back to von Neumann and Mor-
genstern (1944), is regarded as fundamental in the theory of $n$-person cooper-
ative games. This idea is extended to games without side-payments. In the
$\alpha$-coalitional game defined by Aumann and Peleg (1960), acoalition can take
apayoff vector if they have astrategy combination that guarantees the payoff
regardless of the others’ strategy. Aset of payoff vectors which any coalition
cannot improve upon by itself in this meaning is called the $\alpha$-core.
There have been, however, some critics against the $\max-\min$-behavior $hom$
economic point of view: Rosenthal (1971), Chander and $T\mathfrak{u}lkenS$ (1996), Crrarini
and Marini (2004). In the theory of the $\alpha$-core, we assume that acoalition
objects to aproposal without exploiting any effort of the others. In apublic
good provision game, for example, they object if they can improve their payoff
even without using any of public good the outsiders provide. On the other hand,
many economists are interested in the problem arising $hom$ the relation between
the non-excludabllity of public good and the exploitation of the others’ effort,
called “the $hee$ rider problem”. The theory based on the $\max$-mini behavior
excludes any possibility to analyze such aproblem while it is straightforward
theoretically. Some alternatives have been, therefore, proposed.
We also try to define acore-like solution concept to analyze the ffee rider
problem. Before distinguishing our theory from the previous ones, we need to
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$Clar1\mathfrak{b}^{r}$ the interpretation of the core. In my point of view, it is not unique and
sometimes, intentionally or not, treated ambiguously. We need, thus, to clarify
what we intend by the core rather than to discuss what the core really means.
I $t^{\Lambda}hink$ that, following Greenberg (1990, p.p.166-167), who initlates “theory
of social situations”, it is useful to introduce the difference between aprescriptive
theory and adescriptive theory. Imean by a“prescriptive theory” atheory
that provides possible ways to persuade the players for an active intervener.
On the other hand by adescriptive theory Imean atheory that provides an
expectation or an explanation of the result of agame for an observer detached
from the players. In this paper, the core shall be regarded as asolution concept
not for descriptive analyses but for prescriptive analyses. Note that what I
mean by “prescriptive” is different from “normative”. The word, “normative”,
comprises ajudgment about good or evil in economics. We, by the core, discuss
the possibility of intervene but says nothing about good or evil in most grave
sense.
Nom this point of view, the emptiness or the largeness of the core is regarded
to be not apathologlcal but adistinctive result of the theory. On the one
hand, if the core of agame is empty then we find that any proposal to the
players is rejected by some coalition and any intervene turns out afailure. On
the contrary, the non-emptiness of the core implies that we can propose an
outcome that cannot be rejected. Moreover, the largeness of acore implies that
many outcomes can be proposed to the players and cannot be objected by any
coalitlon.
Rosenthal (1971) argues that the core based on the $\max$-mini behavior is not
$\iota$ intuitively stable” in the analyses of economic externality and proposes to as-
sume that the complement coalition chooses a“coalition rational” or “individual
rational” strategy after an improving coalition $S$ chooses their strategy. Ichiishi
(1993, p.p.66-67) argues that if the public good economy is discussed not by
the $\alpha$-core notion but by the strong equilibrium then we observe that we con-
front the free rlder problem. Chander and Tulkens (1996) define another kind
of coalitional game called the $\gamma$-coalitional game. They assume that acoalition
can take aNash equilibrium payoff vector of agame the player of which consists
of all individual outsiders and the coalitlon treated as one player. Crrarini and
Marini (2004) define another alternative by the sub-game perfect equilibrium of
agame where first acoalition chooses their strategy and then outsiders choose
their strategy individually and simultaneously.
Greenberg (1990, p.p.109-110) defines asolution concept through his initi-
ated framework. He considers asituation where if $\bm{t}$ improving coalition, $S$ ,
chooses astrategy then anew game the player of which is $N\backslash S$ arises. His so-
lution is regarded as apossible way of successive intervention. First we conhont
$o$riginal game and propose an outcome for players. If acoalition objects to it
and commits itself to astrategy then the others conhont anew game, called
a“position”, and propose $\bm{t}$ outcome of it. If, in the new game, we propose,
to $N\backslash S$ , a“stable” outcome such that $S$ does not enjoy higher payoff than
their objected agreement in the first game, then the objection of $S$ fails $\bm{t}d$ the
initial proposal is stable in this sense. The stability is defined recursively.
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Apoints of agreement of these studies is that the behavior of $N\backslash S$ is
restricted, which makes it possible to reflect free rider problems. The benefit of
Greenberg ’ $s$ solution is that his theory is consistent as aprescriptive theory
and does not needa so strong assumption on the players’expectations of other’s
behavior. On the other hand, other solutions rely on the assumption that the
players behave as Nash equilibrium describes. The behavior, (improving upon”,
is, however, not consistent with this assumption. The contradiction of such
hybrid solutions has been ignored.
We must, however, polnt out that Greenberg’s solution needs some modifi-
cation. The first reason for this is that Greenberg’s solution is not necessarily in
the $\alpha$-core, which is considered asaweak and fundamental condition for the sta-
bllity of the core. The second reason is that an outcome is stable in Grennberg’s
sense whenever any sub-game has no stable outcome even if we restrict stable
outcomes within the $\alpha$-core. It is strange that having no counter objection gives
agood strategy to the intervener. In this paper, we propose amodification of
Greenberg’s solution ae to clear such problems and discuss an example.
2 Definition
We denote by $\Re$ the set of real numbers. Let $N=\{1,2, \ldots, n\}$ be aset of
players, any subset $S\subset N$ is called acoalition. By $X^{i}$ we mean aset of
strategies of available to $i\in N$ and by $X^{S}$ we refer to aCartesian product
of $X^{i}$ over S. Typical elements of $X^{S}$ are denoted by $w^{S},$ $x^{S},$ $y^{S}$ . Apayoff
function of $i$ denoted by $u^{i}$ is afunction from $X^{N}$ to $\Re$ , and, for all $S\subset N$ we
define $u^{S}$ by $u^{S}$ $:=(u^{i})_{i\in S}$ . Astrategic form game is specified by alist $G=$
$(N, (X^{i})_{i\in N},$ $(u^{i})_{i\in N})$ . Elements of $\Re^{S}$ are called payoff vectors and denoted by
$a^{S},$ $b^{S}$ , and $c^{S}$ . We write that $a^{S}\geq b^{S}$ when, for all $i\in S,$ $a^{i}\geq b^{i}$ , and that
$a^{S}\gg b^{S}$ when $a^{i}>b^{i}$ for all $i\in S$ .
For $S\subset N$ and $x^{S}\in X^{S}$ , we denote by $G|x^{S}$ astrategic form game such
that aset of players are $N\backslash S$ , astrategy of $i\in N\backslash S$ is $X^{i}$ and the payoff of
$i\in N\backslash S$ when $x^{N\backslash S}$ is chosen is defined by $u^{i}(x^{S}, x^{N\backslash S})$ .
Apayoff vector $a^{S}\in\Re^{S}$ is $\alpha$-effective for $S$ if there exists $x^{S}\in X^{S}$ such
$a^{S}\leq u^{S}(x^{S}, y^{N\backslash S})$ for all $y^{N\backslash S}\in X^{N\backslash S}$ . Acoalition improves upon $a^{N}\in\Re^{N}$
via $b^{S}$ if and only if $b^{S}$ is $\alpha$-effective and $b^{S}\gg a^{S}$ . The $\alpha$-core is aset of payoff
vectors, $a^{S}$ , which are $\alpha$-effective for $N$ and can not be improved upon by any
coalition. We say that astrategy bundle $x^{N}\in X^{N}$ is an $\alpha$-core strategy if and
only if $u^{N}(x^{N})$ is in the $\alpha$-core.
The $\alpha$-effectiveness gives amethod to evaluate astratey bundle of acoali-
tion without any conjecture on the others action. Astratey is evaluated by
payoff vectors guarrteed by it. This notion can be regarde.$d$ as $\bm{t}$ extension of
the max-min behavior to NTU game. Some economists criticize this idea td
argue that some strategy of the outsiders’ seems sometimes unrealistic and an
evaluation by the $\alpha$-effectiveness is too pessimistic. Such criticisms are, however,
based only on some intuition and convention of people in the real world. Ido
not follow this criticism here because an intuition and aconvention of people in
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an interactive decision environment should not be adopted as a principle with-
out any restriction in game theory. On the contrary, they should be explained
by the theory. It is only worthy of principle to assume no conjecture.
While the definition of the $\alpha$-core is theoretically persuasive enough, we must
admit that we need to define another core-like solution in order to discuss the
effect of non-excludability of public good on the possibility of agreements.
A set of commitment-proof agreements, denoted by $\sigma(G)$ , is defined re-
cursively. For any one-person game, a strategy bundle is commitment-proof
agreement if it maximizes the payoff of the unique player. For $N\geq 2,$ $y^{N}$ is
a commitment-proof agreement of $G$ if and only if there exists no $S\subset N$ and
$x^{S}\in X^{S}$ such that either
1. $S=N$ and $u^{N}(x^{N})\gg u^{N}(y^{N})$ , or
2. $S\neq N$ ,
and, for all $x^{N\backslash S}\in\sigma(G|x^{S}),$ $u^{S}(y^{N})\ll u^{S}(x^{S}, x^{N\backslash S})$ .
The commitment-proof agreements can be easily interpreted ffom an inter-
vener)$s$ point of view. If a coalition objects to a commitment-proof proposal
and takes $x^{S}$ then the intervener can choose a strategy, $x^{N\backslash S}$ , which is not wel-
come to at least one member of $S$ and is commitment-proof in a situation after
$x^{S}$ is chosen. The intervener can, then, persuade $N\backslash S$ to accept $x^{N\backslash S}$ .
This definition is obtained by a modification of CSSB of coalition commit-
ment situation by Greemberg (1990, p.p.109-110). Our definition become es-
sentially equivalent if (2) is replaced by the following:
3. $S\neq N,$ $\sigma(G|x^{S})\neq\emptyset$ ,
and, for all $x^{N\backslash S}\in\sigma(G|x^{S}),$ $u^{S}(y^{N})\ll u^{S}(x^{S}, x^{N\backslash S})$ .
We call the solution obtained by adding $\sigma(G|x^{S})\neq\emptyset$ Greenberg’ solution
here. The difference is, however, not so trivial. In our definition, if $\sigma(G)$ is
nonempty then for all subgame $F,$ $\sigma(F)$ is also nonempty. On the other hand,
for some subgame $F,\sigma(F)$ may be empty even $1f\sigma(G)$ is nonempty. To see the
adequateness of our definition, remember that we defined CPA from the inter-
vener’s point of view. It is not persuasive to regard an objection as ineffective
only for the reason that the intervener cannot propose any stable outcome after
the objection. In other words, we should consider the intervener to be able
to propose astable outcome only if he can propose astable outcome for any
subgame,
By simple observation, we see that the set of CPAs is asubset of $\alpha$-core
strategies but that of Greenberg’s solutions is not necessarily so. In $Mas$uzawa
(2002), the author proposed tother definition of the commitment-proofness.
The author, flrst, thought that acommitment-proof agreement should be in the
$\alpha$-core, and the condition that it is in the $\alpha$-core is simply added to the definition.
The definition in Masuzawa (2002), however, does not exclude the possibility




Consider the following example due to Shapley and Shubik (1969), called “the
Lake”, Every player has two possible strategies $C$ , and $D$ . For all player $i\in N$ ,
the payoff function is defined by
$u_{i}(x_{1,}x_{n})=\{\begin{array}{ll}-d|\{j\in N;j\neq i, x_{j}=D\}| if x_{i}=D-c-d|\{j\in N : j\neq i, x_{j}=D\}| 1fx_{i}=C,\end{array}$
where $0<c,$ $d$ such that $c/d$ is not an integer. Let $k$ be the least integer such
that $c/d<k-1$ .
Then, three solutions, the $\alpha$-core, Greenberg’s solution, and CPA, give dif-
ferent outcomes.
Proposition 1 In the Lake, the followings hold.
1. The $\alpha$ -core:
$(a)$ If $0<|S|<k,$ $D^{S}$ is the unique $\alpha$-core strategy of $G|x^{N\backslash S}$ .
$(b)$ If $|S|\geq k$ , a strategy bundle $x^{S}$ is an $\alpha$ -core strategy of $G|x^{N\backslash S}$ , if
and only if $|\{i\in Sx_{i}=c\}1\geq k$ , and $|\{i\in S|x_{i}=D\}|<k$ .
2. Greenberg’s Solution (G-CPA):
$(a)$ If $0<|S|<k$ , then $D^{S}$ is the unique G-CPA of $G|x^{N\backslash S}$ .
$(b)If|S|=mk$ for some integer $m,$ $C^{S}is$ the unique G-CPA $ofG|x^{N\backslash S}$ .
$(c)Ifmk<|S|ofG|x^{N\backslash S}.<(m+1)k$ for some integer $m$ , there erists no G-CPA
S. Commitment-proof agreement $(CPA)$ ;
$(a)$ If $0<|S|<k$ , then $D^{S}$ is the unique CPA of $G|x^{N\backslash S}$ .
$(b)If|S|=k,$ $C^{S}$ is the unique CPA of $G|x^{N\backslash S}$ .
$(c)$ If $k<|S|$ , there enists no CPA of $G|x^{N\backslash S}$ .
Strategy $D$ is punishment-dominat over $C$ . Flrom the result of Masuzawa
(2003), the $\alpha$-coalitional game is ordinally convex and the $\alpha$-core is large. Both
a set of G-CPA and one of CPA is smaller than $\alpha$-core in this game. If $m\geq 2$
and $|S|=mk,$ $G|x^{N\backslash S}$ has a G-CPA while some subgames of it have no G-
CPA. The method by Masuzawa (2002) also does not exclude this phenomenon
because G-CPA of this game is in the $\alpha$-core. On the contrary, if the number
of the players is larger than $k$ , the game has no CPA, which means that the
intervener has no strategy to persuade the players to accept. This impossibility
is regarded as a free rider problem.
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